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C/R #49

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CONTACT REPORT

DATE: Week 4-11 March 1954 is period covered by this report

PLACE: Central America was scene of meetings discussed herein.

PERSONS: [] and various individuals in the countries visited.
These latter are named as they enter into the discussion.

DISCUSSION:

1. []

Most of the problems have been settled by delaying the removal of the set up. Now overtime and per diem are the only problems. There are men there who quit their ordinary work and are working at [] as packers. The per diem and overtime situation must be provided for. The gear state of preparedness is very unusual and [] assured [] that [] [] were the best organizers in their field that he had seen. They will make the schedule that has been assigned for them.

2. []

Went and met with CALLIGERIS and talked to him about the deception plan. In any conversation involving time now it is "to be after the rainy season." We discussed how long we could operate in June and late May. Checks were made with other people in [] who are acquainted with the Guatemalan situation. In June the streams will not be swollen too much and the main roads will take the traffic we want to have them take in June. As long as the re-supply comes off in the morning, it is OK.

Discussed the factor of jumping the gun and gained assurance that no man in CALLIGERIS' organization would do so. CALLIGERIS assured that there would be no problems there; he has control and there will be no premature jump-off.

Subject of personnel was discussed with CALLIGERIS. Morale of the personnel in Guatemala suffered last month. There was no actual cash with which to operate in Guatemala for a long time. The men within Guatemala asked about support. Morale of the trainees was a little low because they have been busy in camp construction, movement, etc. CALLIGERIS was assured that that is always the problem with men who volunteer to fight.

There are 150 men in [] and this number was broken down for us. There are about 25 [] and he can have more at any time. He showed how he planned to pick them up. We set up a schedule of movement for him and we have decided to pull these movements to the staging sites - 15 days prior to D-day.

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[] figured that they could get by with a minimum of 13 R/Os, 7 resident and 6 tactical. CALLIGERIS has guaranteed to bring that number up to 15 by this week. CALLIGERIS picked up a couple of fellows from [] who are to be used as an emergency and they will be used as tactical R/Os. Tactical - one each to Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Coban, Quezaltenango, Jutiapa, CALLIGERIS' CP. The Quezaltenango and Coban operators will be launched to defected groups, for arrival H-5.

[] said that the training was under way two days prior to the day of this particular meeting. There was no bilingual problem and as far as he knows there was no trouble with getting the lessons over to the men. [] however, is the man who knows if there is someone there who is bilingual and if the lessons are going over and has indicated inferiority in bilingual personnel.

[] volunteered the information that we could send a man in there tomorrow black and it was discussed that [] replacement could be expedited.

Twenty leaders are there, 10 on the way. There will be a total of 103 men at the camp. We have 37 men in PM training. Eighteen will be kept as saboteurs, 4 as cadre. The remainder to be assigned courier, finca-keeper, guard duty, etc. The 18 (on graduation in approximately one week) will join with 10 incoming potential sab team commanders for approximately 2 additional weeks and then when graduated will go to the staging sites to meet their recruited teams. We have already selected 22 sabotage targets to strike by outside teams plus one "special" team. This requires 23 sab team commanders plus those as-yet-unspotted targets. The expected 15-20 commo trainees and 10 overhead (bakers, cooks, carpenters, etc) makes approximately 100 personnel.

About the men in Guatemala City - his estimate is that they are only awaiting some indication that we are in operation. We discussed timing and the notification of key personnel. Nobody inside is to know that we are backing the operation until we notify these key members. That will be exactly the way it stands now, on 25 April. Otherwise, the people will only know through funds and because certain people are coming out. CALLIGERIS is getting a roster of all personnel to submit to us. It is to be pouched to us. He has sent the identity of people I requested. We have the requested personnel identification. Couriers and persons from the outside are running checks on these people now.

The schedule, in addition to the people coming ~~ix~~ in, is:

20 April - 4 staff members, 8 shock troop members, 18 organizers are to be graduated and these are to be assigned to the staging sites to which they belong. Completion of materiel staging will be attempted.

Trainees in sabotage are to have graduated and will be assigned to staging sites to meet the teams who are also to report on this date to the staging site. This is at all staging sites.

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Starting to run the arms - facts were discussed. New breakdown of one particular kind of material, Pto. Barrios B kit. Because of the manner in which it is to be run it needs different packing. This inc has been passed to the packers.

25 April - Organizers are launched. They are to be briefed and assigned and across the line. We have selected a D-day by this time, i.e., the Group and the Junta has. We have met with CALLIGERIS with the complete military plan for finalization and agreement. We are in accord on the way this is to be run. CALLIGERIS took detailed notes on the way we are going to run it.

[] stated that he is ready now to write up a plan with all the information which he has now gathered. He is ready to write "the plan."

[] stated that so far pitifully little of our staff effort has leaked to the field. He feels that he spends lots of his time writing and he would like to get on an operations level.

On 25 April we are launching the resident R/Os advance party.

25 April - Set up the inner area so it is ready to receive the resident R/Os.

1 May - R/Os graduate. It is requested that resident R/Os proceed [] The tactical R/Os are assigned to the staging sites to which they are to go. There are 4 of them, one to CALLIGERIS' one to Zacapa, one for Coban, one for Jutiapa, one for Quesaltenango and one to Pto. Barrios. Traffic to [] is to commence on arrival at staging site for practice.

D -20 This is deadline on launching resident R/Os with radios

D -15 Shock troops arrive at staging site

D -5 Assassination teams are to have been equipped by our man in Guatemala City

D -8 Sabotage teams move toward position across line

L -15 The assassination leaders receive their instructions

D -5 Signal men launched in order to set up signals so that leaders know that they are 72 hrs. away from active.

D -3 Tactical R/Os to Quesaltenango and Coban. Signal men act.

D -1 Zacapa, Jutiapa, Pto Barrios troops move to line of departure.

D -1.5 hour Troops move across border 1 hour prior to dawn(H-hour)

[] had not made his contact with the high level in [] and CALLIGERIS had been waiting for it.

We located the strip 30 kms north [] [] [] []
[] cover will be provided once rapport is established and gas will be no problem.

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We talked with CALLIGERIS in the terms of the use of a staff in and in building up of his No. 2 man to where he understood what was going on, too. He said that No. 2 was not much of a military man. The next night he brought a military assistant with him who was an insignificant looking individual. There is no leader other than CALLIGERIS. The question of uniforms, insignia was raised and an insignia was drawn up. (Request for 5,000 of these insignia was made at this time.)

[] said he came away with the feeling that CALLIGERIS is a bit sharper than we have been giving him credit for being. He is well organized so far as the running of operations which are pretty smart for an untrained man. The only thing that impresses CALLIGERIS with out efficiency is what leaks down to him.

3. []

[] met with [] felt that rapport could not be established by CALLIGERIS alone but that it would take [] [] tried to determine what commitments [] had made to [] on our part. The second day he said that we were "pledged" to support [] although on the first day he said we had made no pledge of support.

[] brought up the fact that [] said ARENAS was a Commie, sewed up fincas on the border, etc. and as [] on what basis this had been done. [] pulled out [] para E as his authority and guide. [] felt that by the time we got there with the first cable on taking it easy, the door had been opened to [] and the thing had snowballed. [] is the type man who will act fast when he feels he's been given authority. [] feels [] accomplished the first paragraphs of the directive shortly after return and read nothing in the directive to warrant reporting in after completion each step or going slow. He thinks he is in a combat mission. [] said, "I think [] is dangerous to our plans."

[] is a dangerous politician. [] agreed that if we were to pull a deception plan on this fellow, even to the point of having a meeting with him, and if this meeting took place for 2 weeks and kept him busy, releasing him with the thought that he had not produced enough yet, that his danger of "blocking" any CALLIGERIS moves would be negated. Now [] believes that he is in full swing. When [] left [] was beginning to cast around for a way ^{out} of commitments which had been intensified by cutouts association with []

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The only man who believed [] indispensable was [] and by the second day [] was there it was a matter of having committed ourselves to the fact and by the third day he was willing to get out of the commitment if necessary, by plans which would negate [] and ease load off of [] cutout.

There are two possibilities on airports in [] We asked for 2 types of support. We selected one airport which is completely black. We know that we have to do to obtain it. If we get complete support we will use No. 2 airport, otherwise we use just the No. 1

There are nothing but American intelligence officers down there - everyone of them worked for us. [] met all the informant on a casual visit to the [] office.

talked to [] official who had been in Guatemala and who gave him information which he wanted. [] This man is an American, head of []

A workable plan for contact of [] was set up.

There was a meeting with [] who sent word to [] CAL- LIGERIS wrote a letter to [] ambassador to [] The first report from the [] was "inagreement in spirit but [] assigned to find out the details." He stated that he wanted the members of the Group who were there to meet with [] [] and [] refused that meeting, putting it off on the grounds of security. [] did not know that [] was in []

[] sent word that he wanted to see [] He wanted to assure himself that this was something positive. At this point he was dismayed by the delay in the requested meeting since it had been put off for several hours. [] even said he would arrange a meeting with the [] or anyone, for us to set the time and place. [] said that he was surprised that no one had been to see him yet. [] finally went to see him - met him at a private club.

[] first wanted to know who [] were; how much money backed them; what company owned the airplanes; how long this Group had worked with CALLIGERIS; what part [] played in it (this seemed important point). He was eager but he did not want to take false steps. He said he would take these details given him under consideration and give to CALLIGERIS in 3 days an indication of the degree of support which he could expect. [] specific question was: Will [] help us or not? The door was NOT closed.

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[] was told that we wanted cover for the operation (his government must be kept officially out of it) and we wanted them to ignore reports of reported moves. [] feels their answer will be favorable.

[] requested 3 days time before answering. [] thinks that [] wants to know what [] is going to do.

4. As an afterthought, added that CALLICERIS expressed his complete confidence in [] and said he was pleased with what he has been doing.

pm

12 March 1951